NEWCUSH/
Historical Documents
Prospects for Peace
in Sudan
Briefing
January 2004
Justice Africa
31 January 2004
Overview
1.
A final peace
agreement is within grasp. A concord on wealth sharing has been signed. The
parties missed two deadlines for a final agreement (the New Year and 20
January) and have suspended until 17 February. The final hurdles are an
agreement on the marginalised areas and on power sharing. The distance to cover
seems to be relatively small and complex. Hopefully the February round will
represent the final round of negotiations.
2.
The most
difficult issues will arise during the discussion of implementation mechanism
of the peace agreement, especially with respect to the security arrangements
and self-determination. It is crucially important that the international community
and Sudanese civil society remain closely and constructively engaged with
ensuring that the transition to peace is successfully completed, and the
parallel transition to democracy is also effectively undertaken.
3.
The war in Darfur continues to escalate
and poses an increasingly serious threat. It has reached a stage at which
international mediation to secure a political settlement is essential.
Naivasha: What has Been Achieved
4.
On 7 January, the
GoS and SPLA signed a protocol on wealth sharing. This is an important step
forward which promises much. However, there are important gaps and also
questions about effective implementation.
5.
Commentaries on
the wealth sharing agreement have focused on several issues. One of these is
transparency: the need for the parties to reveal their financial flows and to
utilise their resources in an effective and transparent manner. Another issue
is the need for people-centred development, rather than simply a division of
the spoils. A third concern, expressed particularly by Southerners, is that the
agreement focuses on the division of the wealth in Southern Sudan, without due attention to what will be the South’s share in
national resources.
6.
A small but
significant lacuna is that provisions for oil contracts will come into effect
only when a final peace agreement is signed. This provides a loophole for the
GoS to sign contracts quickly which are not subject to the wealth sharing
provisions using the gap between negotiation and the signature of the peace
agreement
7.
A second omission
is water. Given the importance of a fair division of Sudan’s
water resources, and the controversies over the
Jonglei
Canal that
helped contribute to the war, this is a surprising silence. Sudanese are asking
if this omission was made in order not to provoke the Egyptians. There is a
distinct possibility that problems will arise in the future when the government
resumes excavation of the Jonglei Canal or similar major schemes to increase the flow of the Nile northwards. Kenya is
already demanding renegotiation of the Nile Water Agreement.
8.
The impact of the
wealth sharing agreement will depend to a significant extent on whether Sudan can
negotiate a good deal for debt forgiveness with its donors. There is simply no
way that Sudan can service its current debt of more than $20 billion, and a
means will need to be found for reducing this to a manageable figure. Because
of the complexity of Sudan’s debt, which is owed to a wide range of creditors, this will be a
fiendishly difficult task. It should be begun without delay. It is a job for a
joint task force composed of GoS and SPLA specialists.
Naivasha: What has Yet to Be
Achieved
9.
The immediate
challenge for the parties is to reach agreement on the three areas of Abyei,
the Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile. A tentative agreement on the NM/SBN was reached before the talks
broke up, but was not signed because of differences over the geographical
definition of the NM and failure to reach agreement on Abyei. However, the
differences between the parties are quite bridgeable.
10.
The draft deal on
the NM/SBN involves these areas coming under autonomous self-rule for the
interim period. During this time they will be administered by regional
parliaments, which will set their own laws. The SPLA has stated outright that
this will leave them free from shari’a, while the GoS has remained silent on
this question. Towards the end of the interim period (year four), the Regional
parliaments will set in motion a process of ‘popular consultation’. Exactly
what this will entail remains to be elucidated.
11.
This is a
workable compromise between the parties’ positions. It is less than the
position that most NM/SBN civil society, the SPLM and solidarity groups had
hoped for. It places the burden of deciding on the long-term future of the
regions on elected assemblies rather than popular referenda, and does not
specify in detail what choices may be considered in the rather vaguely
described ‘popular consultations’. The challenge now facing those who wish to
see the best possible deal for the NM/SBN is to work within such a framework,
to ensure that the parliaments truly reflect the interests and aspirations of
the people. For example, a major concern of the NM/SBN people is land: ensuring
that the envisaged Land Commission does its job efficiently and fairly will be
an important challenge.
12.
The security
arrangements for NM/SBN are complex. Joint Integrated Units of the Sudan
People’s Armed Forces (SPAF) and SPLA will be formed, and 6,000 troops from the
JIU will be stationed in each area. These troops are to be drawn from the
inhabitants of the areas. At that point, the SPLA and SPAF will withdraw.
However, in parallel with the provision for JIUs to exist alongside SPLA in the
South and SPAF in the North, it is unclear if SPAF units in the main towns will
remain in place. In addition, the uniformed services for the two areas—police,
prison service, internal security—will be drawn from the region, under the
regional governments, with no links to the JIU.
13.
The disagreement
that held up the finalisation of the NM/SBN accord appears to have been over
the geographical definition of the ‘Nuba Mountains’.
Historically, the NM has included at one time or another the districts of
Lagowa, Jebel al Dair and Haiderat/Sound. The current administrative boundaries
exclude these areas. The SPLA wants them included, the GoS does not. However it
is notable that the January 2002 agreement in Switzerland for a ceasefire in the NM specifically included Lagowa. Because
these districts Lagowa, Jebel al Dair and Haiderat/Sound include indigenous
Nuba populations, it seems fair to include them as part of the NM.
14.
There has been no
progress on the issue of Abyei, with each party still sticking to its opening
position. The GoS wants Abyei under the Presidency for an indefinite period
until consultations and studies have been carried out. The SPLA argues that
because the district was taken into Kordofan by the administrative decision of
a paramount chief, it can be taken back to Southern Sudan by a similar
executive decree that simply annexes it to Bahr
el Ghazal.
15.
A compromise
position on status of Abyei should be in line with the 1972 Addis Ababa
Agreement and the1995 Asmara Declaration, namely that there should be a
referendum before the end of the interim period.
16.
The final set of
issues for discussion will be on power sharing. The three-week break before the
talks resume will be an opportunity for the parties to test popular opinion in
North and South on this issue. Most probably, the parties will meet again, ready
to dilute their commitment to electoral democracy. This would be unfortunate.
17.
The NDA Chairman,
Mulana Mohamed Osman al Mirghani, has presented a memorandum to the SPLA and
GoS asking for NDA representation in the forthcoming round of discussions on
power-sharing. During the upcoming Hajj, it is expected that Vice President Ali
Osman Mohamed Taha will meet with the NDA Chairman. The agenda for their
discussion will be the implementation of the Jeddah Agreement, which provides
for power-sharing between the GoS and NDA.
Implementation
Khartoum
20.
Despite the
approach of peace, the GoS continues to override basic human rights. There have
been arrests of Popular Congress members and human rights activists, as well as
an ongoing crackdown on anyone suspected of opposing GoS policy in Darfur. The newspaper al
Ayyam was closed and suspended, for unclear reasons (at first, on
allegations of tax irregularities, later on the charge of endangering national
security). Charges have now been dropped. However, even while it is talking
peace in the South, the GoS is showing few signs of a serious move towards
democracy and respect for human rights.
21.
Hassan al Turabi
has made provocative comments condemning U.S.
involvement in the peace process. The import of these remarks is as yet
unclear. Dr Turabi risks becoming a potential spoiler to any agreement signed
on anything in Sudan. It is possible that he is anticipating serious implementation
problems in the agreement, and positioning himself as the champion of an
alternative approach that may mature in a year or two’s time. As always with
Turabi, his methods are inscrutable, while his motives are transparent: he is
pursuing his own best interest.
22.
The other major
political parties are positioning themselves to take best advantage of the
unfolding peace deal. The DUP has resumed official political activities in
Khartoum (without
having yet registered), in the form of a major rally in Omdurman and a
strategy of ‘public engagement’. Meanwhile, the DUP leader and NDA Chairman is
pursuing the power-sharing accord signed with the GoS in Jeddah. The Umma Party
leader, Sadiq el Mahdi, has reactivated his negotiating committee with the NCP,
while simultaneously talking about opening a wide democratic front. He appears
to be keeping his options open.
The South
23.
The IGAD process
leaves the fundamental issue of South-South reconciliation to the discretion of
the SPLA/M. The SPLA/M leadership prefers to pursue this dialogue on its own
terms, which entails waiting until a peace deal has been signed. However, the
SPLA/M is continuing to talk on a bilateral basis with select Southern armed
groups.
24.
The Southern
Coordination Council and Southern Ministers in government civic leaders of the
are continuing to travel and mobilise support South-South dialogue, visiting
Cairo, London and east African capitals.
25.
The Southern
civic organisations are continuing to find ways and means to conduct inclusive
South-South dialogue. Some are in contact with the SPLM peace desk, civil
society and political secretariats on the issue.
Darfur
26.
As well as being
a humanitarian and human rights disaster in its own right, the war in Darfur poses an extremely
serious threat to the viability of the peace agreement. If the war continues,
political and economic stability cannot be achieved in Sudan.
The conflict exposes one of the weak points in the IGAD negotiating strategy,
namely its inclusion only of major armed groups. For Sudanese constituencies
that have been consistently excluded from power, this sends a simple message:
they can best pursue their political agenda by forcing the government to
negotiate under international auspices. Hence, alongside security issues, the
major demand of the SLA at the last round of (abortive) peace talks was that they should be
recognised politically and should have a power-sharing deal. The GoS rejected
this out of hand. It also rejected international suggestions that the Darfur problem could be settled
utilising the same model as that suggested for the NM/SBN.
27.
In the last
twenty years, conflicts in Darfur have consisted of three major overlapping elements. One is local
strife, over land and access to political office at regional/state level. These
are not ‘age old animosities’ between ‘Arabs’ and ‘Africans’. To the contrary,
‘traditional’ conflict in Darfur consisted either of the military activities of the pre-colonial
Sultanate of Dar Fur (which was centred on the Fur areas but was a multi-ethnic
empire) and armed disputes among different pastoral groups over grazing and
water. The current cycle of conflict dates from the 1980s, when a regional
government was established in Darfur, and competition between a handful of leading politicians took on
an ethnic colour. A Fur bloc (allied with a number of other indigenous groups
such as Tunjur, Berti, and Daju, and intermittently with the Masalit bloc of
the far west) was formed, in parallel to an ‘Arab alliance’ consisting of the
indigenous groups within the Baggara confederation plus camel herders in
northern Darfur (including the Jalul and Mahariya clans of the Rizeigat and
others). Initially, the Zaghawa were aligned with the Arabs. The initial
disputes were purely concerned with power, over controlling the regional
government, an unfortunate example of how decentralisation can destabilise a
region. However, the regional government was also bankrupt, due to economic
crisis, the costs of setting up a regional administration in el Fasher, and
Khartoum’s failure
to provide grants-in-aid (partly on the pretext that Darfur should raise its own
revenue). The paralysis of local government meant that local disputes could not
easily be resolved: district officers were often absent, the police had no
fuel, etc. The older ‘native administration’ system based on village sheikhs
had been dismantled, and while the individuals remained, possessing some social
authority, they rarely had the resources to intervene.
28.
In the mid-1980s, local disputes were worsened
by a combination of drought and increasing pressure on resources. People in Darfur have always been mobile,
and spontaneous north-south seasonal migration and resettlement was a response
to the droughts of 1982-4 and 1987. Semi-nomadic pastoralism has become an
increasingly precarious way of life, due both to protracted economic crisis and
the polarisation of livestock ownership among herders. As a result, formerly pastoral
groups needed farmland to support themselves, and this led them into conflict
with farming communities and banditry. In the period 1987-9, there was
extensive violence connected with these factors. In 1989, the incoming al
Bashir government took two logical steps: it appointed a military governor who
was not from Darfur (thereby removing local competition for the post) and
re-established the native authorities. Immediately thereafter, Darfur experienced relative
peace. However, it is precisely these traditional authorities that have now
provided the socio-political bedrock for the insurrection.
29.
The second
component to the Darfur conflict is its national dimension. The region is neglected and
has, along with eastern Sudan, the lowest proportion of its people holding positions in the
central government. But it has a substantial electorate. National politicians
of all shades have consistently sought to manipulate Darfur for their own agendas.
The Umma Party’s arming of Arab militias in the 1980s seriously escalated the
violence in that period. The SPLA sought to establish a Darfur front with its ill-fated
expedition into the region in 1991. Among the errors made by the SPLA was a
simplistic analysis of the ethnic politics of the region: it seemed to assume
that there was a downtrodden ‘African’ Fur majority ready to rise up and
overthrow its ‘Arab’ oppressors. The SPLA was, like the Sadiq government,
conscripting Darfur for its own agenda. The Darfur reality is far more complicated. On that occasion, the government
restricted its crackdown to a roundup and incarceration of intellectuals and
community leaders, and did not launch a widespread scorched-earth
counter-insurgency. In fact, it sought to further strengthen the native
authorities, seeking to win them around with material reward and by playing on
their devout Islam. This was a short-term expedient. By the late 1990s,
Darfurian Islamists were dissatisfied with their continuing marginalisation in
Khartoum (several
of them published a ‘Black Book’ that documented their systematic
under-representation in government). The split in the Congress Party confirmed
this: their modest stake in central government was all-but-eliminated.
30.
What is new in
the current conflict is that Darfur’s national agenda is, for the first time, in the hands of leaders
from Darfur itself. While the interests of Darfur remain clearly in focus the SLA will continue to be internally strong and gain sympathy throughout Sudan and
internationally. Their challenge is to formulate a political agenda that
represents the interests of their people, in an inclusive way. The SLA has the opportunity to
build bridges to key constituencies, for example those represented by the
Equity and Justice Movement, Sudan Federal Democratic Party and respected elder
politicians from the region. The greatest long-term strength of the Darfur bloc is electoral
numbers: it potentially represents a critical swing group in the national
assembly.
31.
The Janjawiid
militia is reportedly the single major source of destruction and abuse. The GoS
cannot claim ignorance. Its armed forces were unable to cope with the
Chadian-style highly mobile landcruiser-based raids of the SLA. Its air attacks on rebel
bases will have little impact. In this context, its only hope for effective
counter-insurgency is to try to clear the population itself. There is plentiful
evidence of GoS involvement in the planning and implementation of the Janjawiid
attacks. The militia approach has been practised for more than twenty years in
western and southern Sudan, in almost all cases with direct support from Khartoum, and any
denials by the GoS carry no credibility at all.
32.
The third
component in Darfur’s conflicts is the external dimension. Between 1986 and 1990 this
consisted of Chadian and Libyan involvement. Chadian exiles used Darfur as a base to attack Chad
(Idris Deby successfully did so), while the Chadian army (sometimes with French
assistance) counter-attacked against them inside Darfur. Fortunately, the
Chadian dimension is now absent.
33.
The scale of the
current war and humanitarian crisis in Darfur means that action must
be urgent. The depth of the political problem means that a solution must be
sought with care and consultation. A settlement will need to address the
central political agenda of the SLA and other Darfurian groups including the EJM, namely fair
representation of Darfurian interests in central government and national
policymaking. Despite current GoS rejections, a form of local self-rule and
popular consultation will be required. It will also need to address the
profound social, economic and ecological problems of a vast, poor and
long-neglected region.
34.
The crisis in Darfur is too severe for it to
be resolved through internal Sudanese processes. The mediation of Chad,
while welcome, is insufficient: Chad
simply does not possess the diplomatic resources or political leverage to bring
about a solution on its own. Unfortunately, the GoS is reluctant to accept
international mediation. Britain
could play a leading role in pushing for stronger international mediation. It
is critically important that heavyweight international mediation and
humanitarian intervention be brought to bear on this crisis.
The International Community
35.
Advocates of the Sudan
peace process within the U.S.
administration had hoped that there would be a framework agreement ready for
signature immediately prior to President Bush’s State of the Union address on
20 January. This would have given the President the opportunity to point to a
foreign policy success, and would have cemented a commitment to Sudan in
the competitive list of policy and funding priorities for the administration.
It did not work out. The opportunity for some kind of ceremony in
Washington will
recur, but without the same prominence. The U.S.
commitment has not faltered, but as the election grows closer and the budget
deficit deepens, high-level attention to Sudan
cannot be expected to remain at today’s level. The State of the Union address
clearly shifted the administration’s focus to domestic affairs.
36.
Many
international donors have expressed interest in scaling up assistance to Sudan.
The UN agencies are increasing their activities. But the level of diplomatic
representation in Khartoum remains low, a legacy of more than a decade of international isolation.
Many countries (including the U.S.)
have far-reaching sanctions on Sudan,
which will take some time to lift. At a time when aid budgets are not
increasing, and there are major competing demands (notably the HIV/AIDS
epidemic), there are serious obstacles to Sudan obtaining the generous
assistance it will need if peace is to translate into a substantial improvement
in the material welfare of most Sudanese. The international community’s
political commitment to the Sudan
peace process now needs to be matched by a financial commitment to
rehabilitation and development.
Conclusion
37.
The news from Sudan is
good: peace is just around the corner. But as the peace process achieves the
solidity and complexity necessary to bring the war to an end, a substantial
pressure from international community with another deadline is crucial.
38.
The international
community will need to devote substantial energy to ensure the effective
implementation of the peace agreement.
39.
It would be a
terrible tragedy if peace in the South were to be achieved just as Sudan
enters a new and equally vicious war in Darfur. As well as humanitarian assistance, the Darfur war needs immediate
political attention by the international community.
40.
The GOS and the
SPLA/M should commit themselves to peaceful settlement of Darfur conflict. Such
commitment should form part and parcel of the Sudan Peace Agreement.
مجلة الآثار│مجلة
الأنثروبولوجيا│نصوص
ملوك كوش│مؤتمرات
علميَّة│عرض
الكتب والدراسات│ما
قبل تاريخ الصحراء الليبية
ملوك
وملكات كوش│الديانة
الكوشية│الكتاب
الكلاسيكيون│تقنيات
البحث الآثاري│الثقافات
الأفريقية│الببليوغرافيا│الصفحة
الرئيسة